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 During the Argentine Dirty War, the government took a series of precautions against its citizens 
in order to put down subversive activities. These precautions include the creation of a secret task force 
with a power system running parallel to the civilian government, the abduction of citizens suspected of 
subversion, and placing them into a series of secret detention centers all across Argentina. A series of 
human rights violations were committed by the government during this time such as cruel and unusual 
punishment, torture and executions. In this paper, I will briefly outline the events leading to the creation 
of these detention centers, how they functioned, and will also outline some of the torture techniques 
inflicted on the prisoners as well as the disposal techniques taken by the military once the prisoners 
were executed.  
 During the early years of the 1970s political strife was already evident between the government 
and subversive forces such as the Montoneros and the ERP, the Ejercito Revolcionario del Pueblo or 
People’s Revolutionary Army. Between 1970 and 1972, it is estimated that the Argentine government 
had already “disappeared” twelve individuals1. On August 22, 1972, the Argentine Navy had executed 
sixteen political prisoners in the city of Trelew and on June 20, 1973, the government had executed 
approximately 200 Montoneros at the Ezieza Airport located outside Buenos Aires. (Hodges 1991)  
 At this time, the government believed subversives were given free reign about Argentina. 
Therefore, the government realized that they should take special precautions in order to restrict the 
movements of the subversives. The government would take a series of actions to restrict the 
movements of the subversives, following the doctrine of Mao Zedong who said, “the guerrilla must not 
be allowed to circulate like fish in the water.”2 This statement would later be referenced by General 
Jorge Rafael Videla. Shortly after the Ezieza Airport massacre, the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance 
                                                            
1 Donald C. Hodges, Argentina’s “Dirty War:” An Intellectual Biography (Austin, Texas, University of Texas Press, 
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(AAA) would take form. The AAA was armed and funded by the Argentine Ministry of Social Welfare and 
would recruit active duty and discharged police officers, active duty army officer, criminals and cadres of 
right wing organizations such as the Peronist Youth of the Argentine Republic, and the Peronist Trade 
Union Youth. (Hodges 1991) Jose Lopez Rega would serve as the mastermind of the AAA and would be 
organized by Alberto Villar, a coordinator of the police repressions of the early 1970s. The purpose of 
the AAA was to defeat the Marxist organizations in Argentina that waged a “systematic but undeclared 
war” against the Argentine government (Hodges 1991). According to Hodges, it is probable that the 
creation and subsequent acts of the AAA were done without the knowledge of President Juan Domingo 
Peron, for the AAA did not take responsibility for their actions until after his death. 
Although Peron may have been ignorant of the intentions and deeds of the AAA, he was well 
aware of the conflict in his country between leftist subversives and his own government. This sentiment 
was expressed in a document written by Peron and presented to the Peronist Supreme Council on 
October 1, 1973. The first part of this document entitled “Situations,” Peron states that there was a 
multidimensional war being waged between the government and Marxist groups in Argentina. In this 
war, Argentina’s Marxist adversaries sought to slander, threaten and terrorize Argentina’s political 
hierarchy as well as the general population.  
In the second part of this classified document, entitled “Directives,” Peron outlined a list of 
necessary measures to take against Argentina’s subversive enemies. In this part of the document, Peron 
emphasized that an aggressive campaign must be undertaken in order to redefine the differences 
between Marxist doctrine and his own political theory of Peronism. Peron also adds that during this 
state of emergency, anyone who is caught publically criticizing or questioning the government objectives 
will be subjected to censorship. (Hodges 1991) 
In the first seven months of 1975, the AAA was responsible for 450 assassinations as well as 
2,000 disappearances. (Hodges 1991) From February 1975 to April 1976, the Argentine government 
undertook an experiment in which a system of secret detention centers was implemented. They 
operated by abducting citizens suspected of subversive convictions. These abducted citizens would also 
be tortured during their incarceration in the detention centers. During this time, Argentina’s first 
detention center the “Little School of Familia” was created and would serve as a model for the other 340 
detention centers that would follow. (Hodges 1991) 
Once this system was in place, the government would be able to abduct anyone believed to be a 
Marxist subversive. A terrorist, as General Videla defined was not simply “someone with a gun or a 
bomb, but also anyone who encourages their use by ideas incompatible with Western Christian 
Civilization.” (Hodges 1991) However, out of the 30,000 people who eventually disappeared in Argentina 
only a few hundred were actually terrorists. U.S. First Secretary to Argentina, Tex Harris would later 
report that a vast number of the disappeared citizens were “wine and coffee subversives--- kids who sat 
in cafes talking about socialist ideals and how the country ought to be changed. They were easy meat,” 
adding “if they’d sent a hundred of them post cards asking them to come and surrender, ninety five of 
them would’ve shown up.”3 
If the government targeted an individual to be abducted, it would authorize a team of six to 
twenty (or in more radical cases up to fifty) heavily armed Special Forces soldiers to undertake the 
mission.4 These troops would arrive in official and unmarked vehicles in many cases sealing off the 
nearby streets. (Graziano 1992) Once these measures were taken, the troops would seize the targeted 
citizen, often arresting anyone else found in the citizen’s company, using handcuffs, and shrouds. The 
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prisoners would then be placed either on the floors of cars or in the trunk and transported to the 
nearest detention center to be tortured. The prisoner’s empty house and whatever possessions the 
prisoner may have had would be confiscated as “war booty.”5 This included the children of political 
dissidents.  
In some cases involving children, the Special Forces units would put the children in the care of 
the prisoner’s neighbors threatening them to remain quiet about the abduction and the identity of 
child’s real parents. In other cases the children would be placed anonymously on the doorsteps of 
orphanages. (Penchaszadeh 1993) However, most commonly, these children were taken in by the 
Special Forces units and given to childless couples who were loyal to the government. Selling the 
children off to non-subversive individuals was also very common. (Penchaszadeh 1993) 
During their interment, the prisoners would undergo a process of torture and solitary 
confinement in establishments most of which were ironically named after resorts such as “El Motel” and 
“El Refugio6.” (Graziano 1992) Almost immediately upon arrival, these prisoners, now known as 
desaparecidos, would be subjected to sessions of torture. Most of the time, the desaparecidos would be 
blindfolded and face torturers with false names who operated without the official knowledge of 
government officials. One of the two most common techniques of administering torture was 
electroshock treatment. All prisoners were subjected to torture without exception. Ana Maria Careaga, 
a sixteen year old desaparecido who was three months pregnant would later recall:  
“As soon as we arrived at the camp, they stripped and began torturing me. The worst torture was the 
electric prod--- it went on for many hours, with the prod in my vagina, anus, belly, eyes, nose, ears, all 
over my body… When I was on the verge of cardiac arrest, they called in a doctor who gave me pills. 
Then I had convulsions, lost consciousness. So he gave me something else that brought me round. I 
wanted to die, but they wouldn’t let me. They ‘saved’ me only so they could go on torturing me. They 
were saying, ‘we have all the time in the world.’ ‘You do not exist. You’re no one. If someone came 
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looking for you (and no one has) do you think they’d ever find you here?’ ‘No one remembers you 
anymore.’ The impunity they had. One would go eat, another would take his place, then he would take a 
break, and another would replace him.” (Feitlowitz 1998) 
Another commonly practiced method of torture was called the submarine. In the submarine 
torture method, the victim’s head is submerged in a vat of water, urine and feces. When the victim was 
on the verge of suffocating, the victim would be briefly raised from the vat and then submerged again. 
Some victims such as Teresa Celia Meschiati attempted to kill themselves by drinking the putrid water 
but in her particular case she did not succeed. (Feitlowitz 1998) Another form of torture was known as 
the “dry submarine” in which a plastic bag would be placed over the head of the victim until the victim 
was at the point of suffocation. (Feitlowitz 1998) Other torture techniques include rape, burning, being 
attacked by specially trained dogs, sleep deprivation, being forced to watch other people being tortured 
most of the time friends and relatives, exposure to extreme temperatures and noises and simulated 
executions.7 
These torture sessions would be performed in quirofanos or operating theaters. Most operating 
theaters only possessed a solitary metal table on which the victim would be held, however, some 
operating theaters such as ones operated by Alberto “The Uncle” Vega demanded that his operating 
theaters have tiled walls, surgical gowns and rubber gloves. (Feitlowitz 1998) Feitlowitz speculates this 
was due to Vega’s incapability of handling the blood, vomit and excrement involved in the torture 
procedures.  
The goal of the first session of torture was to obtain intelligence about subversive operations 
within twenty four hours of the victim’s incarceration. This is because members of the Montoneros and 
the ERP would be alerted to the capture of their comrade in arms and would dramatically change the 
structure of their operations within those twenty four hours. After twenty four hours of being captured, 
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all of the information the desaparecido possessed would be obsolete. Members of the Montoneros and 
ERP upon being captured were directed to make a one minute declaration and repeat it over and over 
again for twenty four hours. (Hodges 1991) 
Aside from gathering useful intelligence, the goal of the torturers was to break the spirit of the 
subversives and compel them to collaborate with the government in bringing down their own 
organization. The military coerced the captured subversive operatives into believing that they were 
fighting a losing cause resulting that they betray their own side and fight for the government in ending 
the war. This torture technique was far more effective than gathering intelligence as General Camps 
would indicate “Only 5% (of the enemy forces) fell because of military intelligence or chance, the other 
95% because of direct or indirect collaboration.” (Hodges 1991) 
 After the sessions of tortures, most desaparecidos would be shackled, handcuffed, forced to 
wear a shroud and forced into a prison cell called a tubo8. The wearing of the shroud had a profoundly 
dehumanizing effect according to Lisandro Cubas, a survivor of the Navy Mechanics School detention 
who would later say:  
“The psychological torture of the capucha [hood] was bad or worse than the physical… with the ‘hood’ 
on, I became fully aware of my complete lack of contact with the outside world. There was nothing to 
protect you, you were completely alone… The mere inability to see gradually undermines your morale, 
diminishing your resistance…. The ‘hood’ became unbearable, so much so that one Wednesday, transfer 
day, I shouted for them to have me transferred: ‘Me… me… 571.’ The ‘hood’ had achieved its aim, I was 
no longer Lisandro Raul Cubas, I was a number.” (Graziano 1992) 
 In the process of dehumanizing their victims, the guards and torturers aspired to make 
themselves more than men. Some of the torturers are reported to have shouted during sessions the 
phrase “We are God!  We are the law!”9 Other torturers made less extreme statements saying, “Only 
God gives and takes life, but God is busy elsewhere, and we’re the ones who must undertake this task in 
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Argentina.” (Osiel 2001) Some of the torturers made blood pacts by executing prisoners together in 
order to solidify a mutual sense of loyalty and guilt. (Buchanan 1987)  
During this process of state terrorism, the government received deliberate support from the 
Argentine Catholic Church. Local clergymen were often times present at torture sessions in order to 
coerce the victims in order to give a confession. Officers of the higher echelon were advised by priests 
such as Bishop Jose Miguel Medina who as one member of the military junta observed, “both the troops 
and command used to welcome him, avid to hear his preaching, the irreplaceable spiritual sustenance 
for keeping up the struggle and overcoming the lack of understanding… His advice clearly pointed the 
military sword in the right direction.”10  Some priests counseled Navy officers after disposing of bodies 
of executed desaparecidos by quoting Biblical parables such as “the separation of wheat from the 
chaff.” (M. Osiel 2004) One anonymous soldier sought the counsel of the camp chaplain Father Sosa, 
who said to the soldier, “You have to think like a surgeon. If you have to amputate a disease, you can’t 
think about how the patient will look.” (M. Osiel 2004) 
 The Chief Bishop of the Army is also reported to have preached to the officers of the Army 
saying that “the anti-guerilla struggle is for the Argentine Republic, for its integrity, but for its altars as 
well… This is a struggle to defend morality, human dignity, and ultimately a struggle to defend God… 
Therefore I pray for divine protection over this ‘Dirty War’ in which we are engaged.” (M. Osiel 2004) 
 Although many of the members of the Argentine Catholic Church supported the war, some 
clergymen were more moderate in their support. Padre Sabas Gallardo was known for saying that the 
use of torture is sinful if it’s used for more than forty eight hours, the time by which the knowledge 
possessed by the prisoner is considered useless. (M. Osiel 2004) Other clergymen such as Bishop Jorge 
Novak openly opposed the Argentine Dirty War by stating,  
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“One wonders about officials in the recent military government who suspended the constitution and at 
the same time participated in Masses, listened to the word of God, received communion, and professed 
their faith. They must have posed the moral issues involved, so someone must have been counseling 
them. One can draw the logical inferences.” (M. Osiel 2004) 
 After prolonged sessions or torture and solitary confinement, some of the prisoners were 
chosen to be “transferred” or executed. In this process, the prisoners would undergo a system of triage 
in which the more dangerous prisoners would be given higher priority for transfer over the more 
harmless. By this rationale armed subversives are more dangerous than intellectuals or prisoners 
interred for simply passing out subversive pamphlets. In some cases, prisoners deemed incurable would 
be allowed to have visitors and be given the false sense of freedom before they were subjected to the 
transfer process. (Hodges 1991) However, in some cases, the triage system would be abandoned and 
prisoners would be transferred regardless of their threat to society, as U.S. Secretary Harris says in the 
passage below:  
“There was even a guy from Army Intelligence who told me in person that the real tragedy of their 
operations was that half of the people eliminated were innocent even by their own criteria. But it was 
easier to kill them because it was less risky and less compromising than going through the legal 
procedures.” (Malin 1994) 
Just before a transfer the prisoners would be directed to remove their clothes believing what 
they were told by the officers who ran the camp such as “where you’re going everyone gets the same 
uniform” or “you’re going North, you don’t need all those clothes.” (Feitlowitz 1998) A doctor always 
accompanied the transferred prisoners during this time and injected them with Pen-Naval, a sedative 
that gradually rendered the prisoners unconscious. (Hodges 1991) Once the prisoners were unconscious 
their bodies were loaded onto truck and planes to where they would be disposed. Bodies loaded onto 
planes would be thrown out over the Atlantic Ocean to be disposed.  
Bodies loaded onto trucks would either be taken to ovens, such as the ovens of the Navy 
Mechanics School to be cremated. Some of the cremated bodies were placed in anonymous plots in 
cemeteries in Buenos Aires. In 1974, there were 13,120 cremations at the Chacarita Cemetery in Buenos 
Aires. In 1976 that statistic rose to 20,500 and then to 30,000 cremations annually from 1977 to 1979. In 
1980 the statistic for annual cremations fell back down to 21,381. (Hodges 1991) 
In deconstructing the Argentine detention center system, one finds the Nazi doctrine of “Night 
and Fog.” This ideology was developed by the Wermacht in dealing with any individual with subversive 
ideologies against the Third Reich. Under this doctrine, subversive radicals were to be secretly confined 
in concentration camps with no access to the outside world. Upon being captured, the prisoner would 
have no legal rights or recourse. Then as Marshall Kietel of the German High Command was reported to 
have said, “The prisoners shall disappear without leaving traces… and no information shall be released 
concerning their whereabouts or destiny.” (Hodges 1991)  
With this ideology, the Argentine government sought to leave no trace of their desaparecidos. 
However, ever since the end of the Dirty War in 1983, some groups have sought to find the truth. These 
groups include grassroots organizations such as the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, mothers of 
desaparecidos who have made demonstrations in the capital in order to find the whereabouts of their 
abducted children and relatives. Political organizations such as the National Commission on the 
Disappearance of Persons have also launched investigations into uncovering the events of this inhuman 
system.  
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